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JURY TRIAL-UNANIMOUS VERDICTS
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972)
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)
decided whether the states were required to provide
unanimous jury verdicts. The issue arose inci.
4
dentally in 1968 in Dman v. Louisiana, where
the Court held that the sixth and fourteenth
amendments required Louisiana to provide trial
by jury in a case punishable by two years or more
imprisonment. justice White, writing for the court,
stated that the decision would require no widespread change in state criminal processes, because
only two states, Louisiana and Oregon, permitted
less than unanimous verdicts in cases punishable
5
'406 U.S. 356 (1972).
by more than one year imprisonment. In 1970
'406 U.S. 404 (1972).
6
that the
Florida,
v.
Williams
in
held,
3Relevant cases can be divided into three groups. the Court
One group dealt with nonunanimous verdicts in the sixth amendment permitted a state to employ
federal system. American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, juries of six rather than twelve persons. However
166 U.S. 464 (1897), held that Congress could not
permit the then territory of Utah to decide civil cases a footnote suggested that unanimity might be
by a 9 of 12 verdict, since the seventh amendment re- important to ensure that the prosecution bore a
quired jury trial and unanimity was an essential ele- heavier burden of proof. Justice Harlan, dissentment of jury trial as it existed at common law. It expressly avoided the question of the power of a state ing in Williams, stated that less than unanimous
to dispense with unanimity. In 1948 Andres v. United verdicts were unthinkable.8 These comments
States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948), applied American Publish- seemed to indicate that the Court was likely to
ing in a criminal trial in territorial Hawaii. Thompson
v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898), decided a year after require that the states provide unanimous verAmerican Publishing, stated that the federal Constitu- dicts. However, by the time the issue arose for
tion required unanimous verdicts by a jury of 12.
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930), held decision in 1972,9 Justices Harlan and Black had
that the sixth amendment required unanimous verdicts
been replaced by Justices Powell and Rehnquist,
in federal criminal cases, but that unanimity could be
and both new justices sided with the 5-4 majority
United
waived. A Sixth Circuit decision, Hibdon v.
which reversed the previous trend.
States, 204 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1953), overturned an
irregular waiver of a unanimous verdict by a federal
The Louisiana Constitution provides that in
defendant, stating that unanimity was required by
where punishment may be at hard labor,
cases
Circuit,
the reasonable doubt standard. But the First
a unanimous verdict by a jury of 5 is required,
in Fournier v. Gonzales, 269 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 93 (1959), rejected Hibdon, as- but where punishment is necessarily at hard labor,
suming that the Territory of Puerto Rico had the
concurrence by 9 out of 12 jurors is required."0
powers of a state.
A second group of cases contained dictum indicat- burden of proof. See, e.g., Carter v. Jury Commission,
ing that the states were not required to provide un- 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S.
animous verdicts. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605 545 (1967); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954);
(1900), held that a jury of 12, required in federal
Cassel v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
cases, was not required in state prosecutions, and
4 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
jury verdicts nor jury
2
In Johnson v. Louisiana' and Apodaca v. Oregon
Louithe
the Supreme Court upheld provisions of
siana and Oregon Constitutions permitting jury
verdicts by 9-3 and 10-2 votes. The Court held
that unanimous verdicts were not necessitated
either by the requirement of proof of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt or as part of the sixth amendment right to trial by jury.
Despite consideration of a number of cases related to jury issues,' the Court had never previously

stated that neither unanimous
trial itself was required. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968), rejected the Maxwell language on
the right to trial by jury. However, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), held that the Constitution did
not require the states to provide a 12 man jury.
The third group of cases involves the exclusion of
minority groups from jury service. In 1879, Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), established
that tjhe equal protection clause prohibits exclusion of
minority members. However, the absence of such
members from the jury does not in itself violate equal
protection. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 205
(1965). Since states are free to make valid discriminations in selecting jurors, there has been much litigation
over the years on whether particular systems of jury
selection are valid, with the challenger bearing the

5Id. at 158 n.30. Several states permit less than
unanimous verdicts in misdemeanor cases: InAHo
CONST. art. 1, §7 (V); MoNT. CoNsT. art III, §23
(h); OKLA. CoNsT. art. II, §19 (9/); TEx. CONsT. art
V, §13 (9 of 12).
8399 U.S. 78 (1970).
7

Id. at 100 n.46.
8Id. at 122 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
9 A 1968 attempt to raise the issue failed when the

Court refused to apply Duncan retroactively. DeSte-

fano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
ILA. CONST. art. 7 §41. See also LA. CanL PRo.
COnE ANN. art. 782 (West 1966). A provision requir-

ing a unanimous verdict of 12 jurors in capital cases
has been rendered obsolete, for the moment at least,
by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), which held

19721
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Frank Johnson was convicted of armed robbery
by a 9-3 verdict in a trial held prior to the decision

Justice Stewart dissented in Johnson on the
ground that a unanimous verdict was required
of Duncan v. Louisiana. Since the Court had pre- by due process in order to ensure public confidence
viously held that it would not apply Duncanretro- in the fairness of the criminal justice system and
actively,1' Johnson could not argue that unanimous to minimize the danger of jury misconduct and
verdicts were a part of the sixth amendment's bigotry. He felt that the decision undermined a
requirement of trial by jury which Duncan had line of cases prohibiting discrimination in the
applied to the states. Instead he claimed it was jury selection process. 8
mandated by the requirement of proof of guilt
Apodaca v. Oregon" arose under the Oregon
beyond a reasonable doubt, which is applied to Constitution which provides that all verdicts other
the states by the due process clause.P He argued than guilty of first degree murder must have the
that majority jurors should necessarily have some concurrence of 10 out of 12 jurors.2* For a verdict
reasonable doubt if their fellow jurors were not of guilty of first degree murder a unanimous verdict
convinced, and that dissent is itself proof that is required. Three defendants, including Robert
reasonable doubt exists. The Court rejected this Apodaca, were convicted of assault with a deadly
argument and held, in an opinion by Justice White, weapon, burglary of a dwelling and grand larceny,
that unanimous verdicts are not required by due two defendants by 11-1 votes and one by a 10-2
process.18 It felt that a majority would try to per- vote. They argued that unanimous verdicts were
suade the minority until the minority "continues part of the sixth amendment right to jury trial
to insist upon acquittal without having persuasive required of the states by due process under Duncan.
reasons in support of its position." 41 The Court The Court disagreed by a 5-4 vote but without a
felt experience indicated that jurors would not majority opinion or rationale. Justice White, joined
ignore the reasonable doubts of their colleagues. by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun
It found that disagreement within a jury does not and Rehnquist, found that the sixth amendment
prove the existence of reasonable doubt because right to jury tri4 did not require unanimous verconvictions are upheld where reasonable doubt dicts. Relying on historical material similar to
would have been justified or where trial or ap- that considered in Williams v. Florida," he conpellate judges would have disagreed with the jury, cluded that the requirement of unanimity, like
and because in the federal system a hung jury does the jury of 12, was a historical accident. He cited
not result in acquittal but subjects the defendant the deletion of a unanimity provision from the
to possible retrial."1
House version of the sixth amendment to show
Johnson also argued that the Louisiana provi- that the framers' intent was not to require unasions providing for unanimous verdicts in some nimity. He reiterated that the purpose of the jury
but not all cases was an invidious discrimination system was to protect against prosecutorial and
in violation of the equal protection clause.'6 The judicial misconduct and to infuse the common sense
Court disagreed, finding that the standard of of laymen into the criminal process. = He found
proof did not change, but only the number of that this did not require unanimous verdicts, but
jurors to be convinced. Moreover, it found the only required that juries be selected from a cross
state had a rational purpose--to "facilitate, ex- section of the community and be free from inpedite and reduce expense in the administration timidation. He found that the reasonable doubt
of justice" 17-while at the same time it provided standard developed at a different time than the
more jurors in more serious cases.
jury system and was unrelated to the sixth amendment. To counter the assertion that the decision
the death penalty unconstitutional. A provision re- undermined provisions prohibiting discrimination
quiring trial without a jury in cases providing im- in jury selection, White stated that minority group
prisonment not at hard labor was overturned in Dunjurors have no right to veto the conviction of a
can v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
1DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
fellow member since there is no requirement that
12U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV. See In re Winship, 397
minority group members be on the jury at all. 3
U.S. 358 (1970).
13406 U.S. at 363. See also Jordan v. Massachusetts,
18 See cases cited in note 3 supra.
225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912).
"1406 U.S. at 404 (1972).
2ORE. CoqsT. art. I, §11.
1"406 U.S. at 361.
21399
U.S. 78 (1970).
isId. at 1624-25.
1" U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
406 U.S. at 410 (White, J., concurring).
IT406 U.S. at 364, citing State v. Lewis, 129 La. 800,
= Id. at 413. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
804, 56 So. 893, 894 (1911).
(1965).
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He also presumed that minority jurors' views
would be rationally considered by the rest of the
jury. Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion,
adding that he felt that a less substantial majority
than 9-3 would pose a closer question, and that
he would, were he a legislator, oppose the contested provisions.
Justice Powell concurred in the result but disagreed with the reasoning. He read history and
precedent as preserving in the sixth amendment,
and thereby imposing on the federal system, the
jury trial as it existed at common law, including
the requirement of unanimous verdicts.2 4 However,
he felt that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment did not impose federal sixth amendment standards on the states. Although he accepted Duncan's holding that due process required
21
the states to provide jury trial in serious cases,
he felt states should be free to experiment with the
jury system. He agreed with Justice White's
analysis of the fundamental purposes of the jury
sybLcm and their satisfaction by the Oregon practice. He also found support for less than unanimous
verdicts in England, where unanimity was recently
abandoned,3 and in proposals by the American
29
Law Instituten and American Bar Association.
Justice Stewart dissented from the White opinion's holding that unanimous verdicts are not part
of the sixth amendment's guarantee of trial by
jury. 0 Justice Douglas dissented in both cases,
finding a radical departure from tradition and from
2A406 U.S. at 370 & n.6, 371 nn.7&8 (Powell, J.,
concurring). See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S.
276, 280 (1930).
25406 U.S. at 372 n.9 (Powell, J., concurring). Duncan rejected several cases, particularly Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605 (1900), relied on by Justice
Powell for his conclusion that the states may deny
unanimous verdicts. These cases said in dictum that
states may deny jury trial altogether, since due process required only that which was necessary to ordered
liberty. Justice Powell accepts Duncan, finding that
the modem view of due process requires that which is
fundamental in the context of the Anglo-American
jurisprudential system common to the states. He
finds trial by jury, but not unanimous verdicts, fundamental.
26 406 U.S. at 376-77 (Powell, J., concurring).
27See Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury: Notes

BAR

RECORD 195

28ALI, ConE o" CRmMNAL PROCEDURE

§335 (1931).

on an English Controversy, 48 Cm.

(1967).

29ABA, PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRnmAL JUSTCE, STAunARs RELATING TO TRIAL
BY JURY §1.1 & commentary pp. 25-28 (Approved

Draft 1968).
3 406 U.S. at 414 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948).
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cases applying the Bill of Rights to the states. 1
He also noted evidence from the Kalven and Zeisel
jury studies 2 indicating that nonunanimous verdicts would provide more acquittals than convictions and would lead to hasty verdicts decided
without proper deliberation. Justice Brennan
echoed Justices Stewart and Douglas. justice
Marshall's dissent disputed three other bases of
the White opinion. It argued that guilt is not
proved beyond a reasonable doubt if all jurors
are not convinced, that the fact that the Constitution permits retrial after a hung jury does not
imply that it permits conviction by less than unanimous verdict, and that if a jury is properly selected
and composed of rational persons, then the irrationality objected to by Justice White is in fact
part of the essence of the jury system.
The basic issues presented in the cases are
whether unanimous verdicts are inherently part
of the trial by jury which is required of the states,
and whether nonunanimous verdicts are consistent
with proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is required of the states, 3 but the Johnson majority
held that this does not require that jury verdicts
be unanimous, since the reasonable doubt standard
lies in the mind of each individual juror and not
in the way the votes are counted. This double aspect of the reasonable doubt standard has long
been recognized but, as Justice Marshall notes,
it strains the language to say someone has been
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt when
three jurors disagree. The Johnson opinion's answer
seems to be a suggestion that the minority jurors
are being unreasonable because they cannot persuade the majority jurors. 5 It cites language from
the "Allen charge" 16 telling minority jurors on a
deadlocked jury to consider whether their views
are tenable in view of their inability to persuade
others who are equally intelligent. However, suggesting that a juror consider whether he is being
31406 U.S. at 381-84 (Douglas, J., dissenting). oct
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
3"H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, Tim AMEmRCAN JURY
460, (1966) [hereinafter cited as KALvEN & ZEISEL]

cited by Douglas, J., dissenting, 406 U.S. at 391 & n.5.
'3In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
3' See Comment, Waiver of Jury Unanimity-Some
Doubts About Reasonable Doubt, 21 U. Cm. L. Rxv.
438, 441 (1954).
35 406 U.S at 361-62.
36 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492,501 (1896).
For criticism of the Allen charge, see KALvEN &
ZEISEL, supra note 32, at 454 n.3.
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unreasonable is different from establishing as a
matter of law that he is. Furthermore, the fact
that jury verdicts are sustained where trial or
appellate judges or hypothetical reasonable men
might disagree has little bearing on what should
happen when the jurors, the established triers of
fact, do disagree. In addition, the opinion construes the fact that a federal defendant who receives a hung jury can be retried and convicted
by a unanimous verdict to indicate that conviction
is possible even though some jurors are never convinced of guilt. However, conviction on retrial
after a hung jury bears more resemblance to a
verdict reached after several votes than to a less
than unanimous verdict, since at least some jury
must be unanimously convinced of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt before the defendant can be
convicted. The Johnson Court's arguments on the
reasonable doubt issue are unpersuasive.
Apodaca turned on the question of whether
unanimous verdicts were inherent in trial by jury
required of the states by the sixth and fourteenth
amendments. Determination of what constitutes
trial by jury is difficult because the jury is a legal
institution which has developed over centuries
in England and the United States. Unless one
accepts, as Justice Powell does, that the Constitution adopts all aspects of the jury system as it
existed in 1787, it is necessary to make a "functional analysis" of the jury in order to determine
the fundamental purposes it serves. This analysis
must consider the reasons for the original development of the jury, the reasons for its retention in
the legal system if the old reasons became invalid,
and the reasons for its retention today.
In his Apodaca opinion Justice White adopted
the results of the searching historical and functional analysis given the jury system in Duncan v.
Louisiana and Williams v.Florida.u In those
cases, determining whether states were required
to provide trial by jury in serious cases and whether
the jury had to be composed of twelve persons,
the Court found that the essential purpose of the
jury was "to safeguard against the -corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,
biased or eccentric judge," 11 and "the interposition
between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in
the community participation and shared responsi391 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1968).
28399 U.S. 78, 87 nn.19&20, 92-100, 9& n.45 (1970).
31Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).

bility that results." 40 After accepting that view
of the jury's purpose, Justice White suggested
four historical reasons for the development of the
unanimous verdict rule: 1) the absence of other
rules ensuring a fair trial; 2) the medieval practice
of trial by compurgation where twelve witnessjurors were required to convict; 3) the possibility
of perjury charges against a dissenting witnessjuror; and 4) the medieval concept of consent which
required unanimity to bind a community.4 Such
reasons, relevant in the late fourteenth century,
have little significance today and do not explain
why the tradition of unanimous verdicts persisted
through 1787 to the present.
The dissenting opinions argue with much force
that the reasons for the persistence of the unanimous verdict are the same as the reasons for the
reasonable doubt standard-to maintain community confidence in the criminal justice system and
to avoid the serious harm resulting from wrongful
conviction.42 The Court considers evaluation of
community confidence a job for legislators,43 but
it is difficult to avoid the constitutional implications of the prevalence of unanimous verdicts at
the time the Constitution was adopted." Moreover, stating that the jury exists only to protect
against prosecutorial and judicial misconduct, to
infuse commonsense into factfinding and to spread
responsibility for the decision of whether to use
criminal sanctions, although adequate for the
issues presented in Duncan and Williams, overlooks other policies relevant to unanimous verdicts. The jury is a democratizing force in the law
which at times functions properly by ignoring
legislative and judicial commands. 45 The unanimous verdict acts as a check on the jury's power
and ensures that its decisions reflect the most
broadly shared values. The dissenters, particularly
Justice Marsha'l, grasp this aspect ot the jury
which the other Justices ignore.
Justice White's functional analysis leads him
40Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
41406 U.S. at 407 n.2 (White, J., concurring in
Johnson).
42406 U.S. at 398 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at
392 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
41406 U.S. at 364-65; id. at 366 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
44See 406 U.S. at 408 & n.3 (White, J., concurring).
Justice Harlan, dissenting in Williams, noted the
final wording of the sixth amendment as likely represents a streamlining of language as a statement of
constitutional indifference to the unanimous verdict.
399 U.S. at 123 n.9 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
46 See P. DEvLiN, TRiAL By Jumy 164 (1956).
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to the conclusion that no essential purpose of the pressly evaluate the merits of these reasons against
jury requires unanimity.46 Except for a footnote unanimity, a majority of justices consider them
comment that unanimity proved unworkable in strong enough to permit the states to rely on them
fifteenth century Parliament,0 he offers no reasons despite the prevalence, historically and today, of
against unanimity.48 Presumably he considers eval- less than unanimous verdicts.
uation of such issues to be a legislative function.49
Appellants also argued that less than unanimous
Justice Powell presents some reasonb against una- verdicts would deprive minority group jurors of
nimity,50 including the ease of bribing a single the ability to cause a hung jury and prevent'conjuror"1 and the possibility of a hanging juror who viction, and would thereby render meaningless
through wilfulness and stubboress closes his decisions which prohibit discrimination in jury
eyes to the law and the evidence. He also notes selection. 55 Justice White in Apodaca, after noting
that the unanimity rule does not always produce that minority group members do not have the
true unanimity but rather often causes compromise right to have fellow members on their particular
verdicts, sometimes contrary to the facts in evi- juries,516 stated that if such members are on the
dence, which will lessen any deterrent effect of jury they have the right to try to persuade the rest
conviction and further erode the confidence of of the jurors of their position. He presumes that
participants and the public in the criminal process. the majority will act rationally and in good faith
Other reasons alluded to in the opinions include toward the minority group members. This appears
the cost of retrial in money and court time,u the to be an overly optimistic view of the history of
fact that important public decisions are made minority group relations in the United States."
by judges, legislators and voters by less than unan- Nevertheless a majority of the Justices feel that
imous votes,u and the likelihood that less than protection of minority groups is not an essential
unanimous verdicts will increase the number of function of the jury and does not justify a unaniconvictions." Although the Court does not ex- mous verdict requirement.
Johnson and Apodaca leave several questions
46justice Powell would agree that no essential
open. Five Justices are of the opinion that unanipurpose of the jury requires the states to provide unanimity, although he sees the federal system as being
mous verdicts are required in federal criminal
bound by history.
trials, even though five Justices found them not
47406 U.S. at 407 n.2 (White, J., concurring).
48 See generally Comment, Should Jury Verdicts Be required in state trials. Only Justice Powell finds
Unanimous in Criminal Casest, 47 ORE. L. REv. 417
this theoretically consistent, and it is not clear
(1968).
49
The Louisiana procedure, said to be designed
that unanimity would be required in federal trials,.
"to facilitate, expedite and reduce expense in the were the issue to arise in the future.- A question
administration of criminal justice," 406 U.S. at 364
is also raised as to how small a majority is perappears to be rooted in that state's civil law tradition.
See, Comment, Jury Trial in Louisiana-Implications missible. The functional analysis in Justice White's
of Duncan, 29 LA. L. RZv. 118, 120 (1968). The OreApodaca opinion does not appear to require more
gon practice was adopted by constitutional amendthan a simple majority, although Justice Blackmun
ment in 1934 during a period of nationwide controversy concerning the jury system. See Comment,
expresses misgivings.-' However, the Johnson masupra note 48, at 418.
jority found the rea.sonahh' doubt standard satis50406 U.S. at 377 (Powell, J., concurring).
51 This has been cited as the reason for the abandonfied because a "substantial" and "heavy" majority
ment of the unanimity rule in England. Kalven &
Zeisel, supra note 27.
62406 U.S. at 364.
6 Id. at 362-63. Id. at 407 n.2 (White, J., concurring
in Apodoca).
R This issue was severely disputed. Justice Douglas
cited the Kalven & Zeisel jury studies, indicating that
twice as many nonunanimous verdicts will result in
convictions as acquittals. KALVEN & ZEISEL at 460,
Table 125, quoted by Douglas, J., dissenting at 406
U.S. 391 n.5. This is the same ratio as that of convictions to acquittals generally. KALVEN & ZEISEL at

461. Thus when Kalven and Zeisel say "the probability that an acquittal minority will hang the jury is
about as great as that a guilty minority will hang it,"
id., they mean that acquittal minority jurors are no
more stubborn than conviction minority jurors, not
that an equal number of hung juries (and therefore
nonunanimous verdicts) will be for acquittal as for

conviction. But the latter meaning is what Justice
White appears to have in mind when he uses the quotation in his Apodaca opinion. 406 U.S. at 411 n.5.
15See cases cited in note 3 supra.
51Swain v Abamna, 380 U.S. 202, 205 (1965).
57For abuses against minority groups perpetrated
through the criminal justice system, see Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 250 n.15 251 (1972) (Douglas,
J., concurring); id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring) indicating that blacks have received a disproportionateshare of death sentences in rape cases.
1 Federal unanimous verdicts are required under
FEn. R. Cnms. P. 31(a). In the 38 years that Oregon
and Louisiana have had nonunanimous verdict provisions, other states and the federal system have not
been persuaded to follow, although these cases may
persuade them to do so.
1 406 U.S. at 366 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

